A Functional Failure Analysis Method of Identifying and Mitigating Spurious System Emissions From a System of Interest in a System of Systems by Van Bossuyt, Douglas L. & Arlitt, Ryan M.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Faculty and Researchers Faculty and Researchers' Publications
2020-10
A Functional Failure Analysis Method of
Identifying and Mitigating Spurious System
Emissions From a System of Interest in a
System of Systems
Van Bossuyt, Douglas L.; Arlitt, Ryan M.
ASME
Van Bossuyt, Douglas L., and Ryan M. Arlitt. "A functional failure analysis method of
identifying and mitigating spurious system emissions from a system of interest in a
system of systems." Journal of Computing and Information Science in Engineering
20.5 (2020): 054501.
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/67950
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. As such, it is in the public domain, and under the
provisions of Title 17, United States Code, Section 105, it may not be copyrighted.
Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun
A Functional Failure Analysis Method of
Identifying and Mitigating Spurious
System Emissions From a System of
Interest in a System of Systems
Douglas L. Van Bossuyt1





Department of Mechanical Engineering,
Technical University of Denmark,
DK-2800 Kgs. Lyngby, Denmark
e-mail: rmarl@mek.dtu.dk
Increasingly tight coupling and heavy connectedness in system of
systems (SoS) present new problems for systems’ designers and
engineers. While the failure of one system within a loosely
coupled SoS may produce little collateral damage beyond a loss
in SoS capability, a highly interconnected SoS can experience sig-
nificant damage when one member system fails in an unanticipated
way. It is therefore important to develop systems that are “good
neighbors” with the other systems in an SoS by failing in ways
that do not further degrade an SoS’s ability to complete its
mission. This paper presents a method to (1) analyze a system of
interest (SoI) for potentially harmful spurious system emissions
(failure flows that exit the SoI’s system boundary and may cause
failure initiating events in other systems within the SoS) and (2)
choose mitigation strategies that provide the best return on invest-
ment for the SoS. The method is intended for use during the system
architecture phase of the system design process when functional
architectures are being developed, and analysis of alternatives
and trade-off studies are being conducted.2
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1 Introduction
As the field of system of systems (SoS) engineering has devel-
oped over the last several years, an emerging area of interest is
how well member systems behave with each other. Many system
engineers desire systems of interest (SoIs) that are “good neighbors”
to other systems within the SoS in both nominal operation and in
degraded or failed system states. While failure mode effects and
criticality analysis (FMECA) and probabilistic risk assessment
(PRA) techniques among others are currently being used to help
design SoIs in later phases of the system design process, there is
a need for an approach that analyzes the effects that an SoI operating
in a degraded or failed state has on its SoS neighbors during the
early system architecture phase of SoI development. Understanding
the effects that an SoI may have on its neighbor systems very early
in the system design process allows for large changes to be made at
relatively low cost and with minimal impact to a system develop-
ment schedule.
1.1 Specific Contributions. In this paper, we present a
method intended for the early system architecture phase of the
systems engineering process where functional architectures are
under development. The method helps to identify and mitigate
potential failure flows exiting an SoI’s system boundary—spurious
system emissions (SSEs)—that otherwise may not have been iden-
tified or may have been discounted. This method helps to develop
strategies to mitigate SSEs from the very earliest functional model-
ing efforts of a new SoI. System engineers can use the method to
identify potential SSE sources from an SoI into the SoS and
propose mitigation strategies to address the identified SSEs.
While other methods such as PRA and FMECA can be used to
investigate potential SSEs, those methods are generally employed
either later in the system development process after system architec-
tures have been selected and frozen or do not directly integrate into
existing functional analysis methods.
2 Background and Related Work
The work presented in this article is set within the context of the
systems engineering process that takes a system from initial concept
to production, customer delivery and use, maintenance and upgrade,
and disposal [1,2]. Of particular interest to this research is the early
phase of systems engineering that is encompassed by the system
architecting process where customer need statements, design refer-
ence missions, system requirements, functional system models and
architectures, trade-off studies, and a variety of other activities
occur [2,3]. Mission engineering [4–7] and SoS engineering also
play a significant role in many SoI system architecting efforts [8,9].
Functional modeling helps to develop an understanding of how
systems work at the functional level [10] during system architecture
development. There are a variety of different taxonomies available
to produce functional models [11]. We prefer the functional basis
for engineering design (FBED) [12,13] and use it throughout this
paper. A functional modeling taxonomy generally is composed of
functions and flows where functions transform incoming flows to
different outgoing flows. Functions and flows are connected to
their physical component solutions through databases and reposito-
ries [14–16]. One function may have many potential component
solutions, such as converting electrical energy function to rotational
energy function may be satisfied by several types of electrical
motors and flows can similarly have multiple physical manifesta-
tions [17].
Throughout the system design process, a variety of failure anal-
ysis methods are often employed such as FMECA early in a system
design process [18] and PRAwhich often is done after major system
architecture decisions have been made [19]. PRA uses the concept
of an initiating event—an event that is the starting point for a failure
that propagates through a system [20]. Many systems engineered
using PRA have the ability to react to incipient failures and either
transition to a safe shutdown state or continue operating either nom-
inally or in a degraded state while repairs are made [21,22] although
unanticipated failures can still occur which may lead to system
failure.
Reliability block diagrams (RBDs) can be used to analyze the
reliability of a system either from the component or functional
level [23]. The function failure identification and propagation
(FFIP) family of methods extends the concept of RBDs to under-
stand how failures propagate through a system, how to detect incip-
ient failures, and what may be done to mitigate such failure events
[24,25]. Some work has been done that includes the authors of this
paper to understand how to redesign an SoI at the functional level to
withstand SSEs that enter the SoI as unanticipated failure initiating
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events [26]. Our previous work is in contrast with the method
advanced in this paper that specifically focuses on not allowing
SSEs from an SoI to occur that may negatively affect the rest of
an SoS.
In summary, within the scope of early system architecture where
functional models of a SoI are under development and major archi-
tectural design decisions have not been finalized, no existing
method that we are aware of is available to system engineers to sys-
tematically identify potential SSEs and propose mitigation strate-
gies from a functional perspective.
3 Methodology
In this section, we present a novel method to identify potential
SSEs originating in an SoI that could negatively impact other
members of an SoS, quantify potential SSE probabilities, identify
potential mitigation strategies to prevent SSEs from causing harm
to other systems in the SoS, and conduct trade-off studies to deter-
mine the best course of action moving forward with the SoI system
design. The method is intended to be used during the system archi-
tecture phase of system design where large changes to an SoI design
can be made with relatively little impact to cost or schedule.
Figure 1 depicts the seven steps of the methodology, the reusable
dependencies, and the preparatory step, and their relations to one
another.
3.1 Case Study. In order to demonstrate and illustrate the
method throughout the methodology section of this paper, we
now introduce an illustrative case study of an autonomous vehicle
SoI that is being designed to enter service with an autonomous
logistics system (the SoS). The SoI is currently in the system archi-
tecture phase of the system design process, and specifically, the
functional architecture is being refined. The SoS operates in a
mountainous desert environment carrying material from a logistics
depot to a forward operating base. This frees up military personnel
and contractors from routine and potentially dangerous resupply
missions [27] to concentrate on other high value activities. There
are other constituent members of the SoS including the logistics
depot and co-located ground control station, command and
control relay stations, and other autonomous systems such as auton-
omous ground vehicles. Figure 2 shows a high-level operational
view of the SoS.
The system architecture process for the SoI has already down-
selected to the production of an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)
for the specific payloads and mission constraints identified during
the development of the customer needs statement, the design refer-
ence mission, and the system requirements (shown in Table 1).
While the SoI presented in the case study of this paper is ideal-
ized, it takes inspiration from real systems [6,28]. The case study
is used to illustrate each step of the method presented below and
has been intentionally simplified to better highlight the specific con-
tributions of the method.
3.2 Reusable Dependencies. Prior to beginning the prepara-
tory step of the method, reusable dependencies (e.g., function to
component relational database, cost and performance data, func-
tional failure modes, etc.) are identified and developed as necessary
and are specific to the SoI. Once created, these resources can
support multiple SoI analyses when the SoIs are deemed similar
enough by practitioners. Reusable dependency databases include
historical function to component relationships [15,16], function to
failure data and relationships [25,29,30], cost and performance
data of components (seeded automatically where practical [31]),
and abstracted behavior failure behavior models [25,29].
3.3 Preparatory Step. Several preparations must be made
within two categories: (1) prepare a FFIP model of the system
and (2) prepare information for the trade-off study conducted in
steps 6 and 7 prior to entering the main method.
To develop a FFIP model, a functional model of the SoI must first
be developed. In order to do this, a functional taxonomy must be
chosen to match the taxonomy used in the reusable dependency
Fig. 1 High level flowchart of the relationships between the seven steps of the method, the
preparatory step, and the reusable dependencies








aval Postgraduate School user on 01 Septem
ber 2021
databases (e.g., Ref. [12]). In many cases, a nominal system design
process will already have developed a functional model as part of
modeling the system [3]. Figure 3 shows a high-level FFIP model
for the case study SoI UAV developed using FBED.
Next, system requirements information must be collected includ-
ing performance metrics and system constraints. Cost and failure
probability constraints in particular are required to use this
method. Other requirements and constraints will vary depending
upon the specific SoI. Generally, these data will already have
been developed as part of the system design process. Table 1
shows the requirements for the UAV SoI. This information will
help to set goals for the trade-off studies conducted in step 6 of
the method.
Finally, an analysis of the SoI’s place in a larger SoS environ-
ment must be undertaken which will be used in steps 6 and 7 of
the method. Questions to ask are (1) what other systems are
present, (2) how important is it that each system continues to func-
tion, (3) what is the cost of having a system fail, and (4) what exter-
nal event(s) may cause a system to fail. The resulting information
then is recorded in terms of consequences for other systems
within the SoS failing. Consequence data are shown in Table 2
for the case study. The consequence is determined by the cost dis-
tribution function, Ce, defined as the probability density of the cost
of a system damaging other systems within a SoS from emitted
failure flows.
3.4 Step 1: Analysis of Each Function and What It
Conceivably Could Emit. Previous to step 1, reusable dependen-
cies including a function to component relational database contain-
ing failure modes information were developed. Now the failure
modes must be expanded to go beyond failures that have been pre-
viously observed. To identify a high proportion of all possible
emitted failure flows beyond what has previously been identified
with existing methods, we advocate working backwards from the
flow taxonomy of FBED to disprove the hypothesis that each of
the flow types can be emitted as a failure flow by the function in
question. For instance, the energy-thermal flow may be generated
by a function such as control-stop-inhibit where the component
solution is a metal barrier if the function receives a failure flow
input such as energy-vibration where the flow’s physical solution
is a high frequency, high amplitude vibration caused by an unantic-
ipated failure somewhere else in the SoI. Table 3 presents an
example of a function where potential received failure flows are
connected to emitted failure flows and associated potential compo-
nent solutions to the function. The crossed-out failure flow exports
represent those exports that have been found to be impossible to
create regardless of the failure flow import to the function.
The newly identified failure flow exports shown in Table 3 from
the function are then appended to the function’s failure database
entry.
Fig. 2 High-level operational concept view of the SoS. The existing SoSmember systems include
unmanned ground vehicles, a logistics depot and ground control station, command and control
relay stations, and the forward operating base. The new SoI UAVs are also represented on the
graphic.
Table 1 SoI requirements for a UAV used to carry cargo
Req Requirement
1 Carry 10 kg 5 km
2 Complete round-trip transit with 99% success rate
3 Communicate with ground control station at 1.5Mbit/s TX/RX
⋮ ⋮
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3.5 Step 2: Evaluate All Potential Flow Paths Through the
System of Interest. Next, a partial re-evaluation of the FFIP
model of the SoI is conducted. All potential failure propagation
paths that lead to a failure flow exiting the system boundary are
identified as per the FFIP method; however, we do not assign prob-
abilities to individual flow paths, functional failure events, or initi-
ating events at this point in time. The proposed method intentionally
does not assign probabilities at this step to avoid the pitfalls of trun-
cation of failure flow paths that often occurs during FFIP-style anal-
yses. A small sample of failure flow paths that exit the system
boundary from the SoI is presented in Table 4.
3.6 Step 3: Determine Probabilities of Spurious System
Emissions Exiting the Systemof Interest. After all failure flow
paths have been identified, the next step is to quantify the probabil-
ity of each failure flow emitted as a SSE from the SoI. This step
diverges from established FFIP practices. Rather than stopping at
producing cut-sets (the paths that a failure follows from initiation
to exiting the system as a SSE) that are analyzed individually, the
probability of each SSE is developed from aggregating cut-sets
into groups based on the specific SSEs that they produce.
Table 5 shows a representative subset of cut-sets for the UAV SoI
that only includes the SSEs identified through this method. Each
SSE type and probability of occurrence, POe, is listed where the
probability is an aggregation of all SSE failure flow path cut-sets
that result in that particular failure flow emission type.
3.7 Step 4: Analyze Results. Next, the results of the prior
steps are analyzed to understand the potential consequences to the
other systems within the SoS. Table 2 provides a means for evalu-
ating how SSEs from the SoI may impact other systems in the SoS.
A mapping of SSEs produced by an SoI to initiating events of other
systems in the SoS with a probability of negative consequence (Pe)
to the other systems can be produced. We propose that Pe can be
combined with Ce developed in Table 2 into an emission priority
(EP) which we suggest as a metric to make comparisons between
SSEs similar to how the risk priority number that FMECA produces
is used and the general understanding of how engineering risk is cal-
culated (e.g., risk = probability × consequence). The calculation to
produce EP for a given flow emission e is provided in Eq. (1).
Table 6 provides a representative subset of EPs for the UAV SoI
that are rank ordered based on the EP which indicates which
SSEs have the biggest negative impact on the SoS.
EPe = Pe × Ce (1)
Fig. 3 An FFIP model of the SoI UAV developed using the FBED taxonomy. The dotted dashed line represents the
system boundary. The dashed line represents a SSE.
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3.8 Step 5: Identify Spurious System Emission Mitigation
Strategies. The next step is to develop approaches to mitigate
SSEs before they leave the SoI. In this method, we advocate for
addressing SSEs before they leave the system boundary in order
for the SoI to not potentially initiate failures in neighboring systems.
We recommend information on mitigation strategies including
both the functional representation and the physical solution to each
mitigation strategy. Additionally, information on (1) the likelihood
of completely mitigating the SSE, (2) other failure flows that may
be created by the mitigation strategy, and (3) other relevant failure
data should be captured at this stage. Table 7 shows an example of
several mitigation strategies for the SoI where PMe is the probability
of a mitigated SSE still occurring in spite of the mitigation strategy.
New failure flow leaving system (NFFLS) represents if a new failure
flow produced by a failure within the implementation of the mitiga-
tion strategy may leave the SoI system boundary as a SSE. PMf is
the probability of an NFFLS leaving the SoI as a SSE. Note that
PMf does not provide insight into if the new SSE can damage other
systems within the SoS. MC is the mitigation implementation cost.
In order to understand what mitigation strategies are preferred,
we proposed developing a mitigation probability (MP) which is
similar in formulation to EP. To calculate a population of MPs
where one mitigation strategy may be useful in mitigating several
SSEs (or one emission may be addressed to different extents by dif-
ferent mitigation strategies), a matrix is populated with EPs that
reflect a reduction in Pe, denoted by EPReduced. Equation (2) dem-
onstrates how to calculate EPReducedwhere e is the SSE andm is the
mitigation strategy.
EPReduced(e,m) = PMe(e,m) × Ce(e,m) (2)
An example of the matrix that is populated by Eq. (2) is shown in
matrix (3). Here, each row corresponds to a failure emission while
each column corresponds to a mitigation strategy. Many of the cells
resolve to zero in this matrix, indicating that the mitigation strategy
















Next, MP can be calculated for the matrix produced from Eq. (2)
as shown in Eq. (4). In this equation, EP

represents a column vector
of the original EPs as identified in Table 2.
MP = EP
T
× EPReduced +MC (4)
3.9 Step 6: Determine What Mitigation Strategies to
Implement. In order to determine what mitigation strategies to
implement in a SoI to reduce its potential negative impact on the
SoS, we propose the mitigation rank priority (MRP) metric which
converts MP into a metric than can be more easily rank-ordered.
Equation (5) shows how to determine MRP for a specific mitigation
strategy, m.
MRPm = rank(max (MPm))
+ rank(mean(MPm))
+ rank(std(MPm)) (5)
MRP as presented in Eq. (5) is only one potential formulation of
MRP, where each term corresponds to the estimated worst case
(max), average case (mean), and predictability (standard deviation)
of the distribution. Practitioners may wish to change the formula-
tion depending on, for instance, how much confidence they have
in their data sources. The important aspect of MRP for the pur-
poses of this method is that it can be used to develop rank order-
ings and trade space exploration analysis which may be useful to
SoI system stakeholders and decision-makers for their understand-
ing of SSE risks and mitigation strategies. In short, MRP helps in
the communication of risk management to stakeholders and
decision-makers.
At this point in the method, trade-off studies and optimization can
be conducted between major SoI system constraints and require-
ments, mitigation strategies and their corresponding reduction in
probability of a SSE from leaving the SoI system boundary that
adversely impacts other systems within the SoS, and other impor-
tant system performance metrics. An approach we suggest is to
maximize total MRP (sum of all MRPm identified for implementa-
tion) within the constraint of a cost cap on total mitigation cost (MC)
for the SoI.
3.10 Step 7: Iterate and Reanalyze. Now that mitigation
strategies have been chosen and are ready for implementation into
the SoI system functional model, and we suggest iterating
through the method at least once more to verify that the mitigation
strategies have not introduced new failures into the SoI or SSEs that
are undesirable. In particular, Table 7 indicates if there are new
SSEs (PMf) created by the proposed mitigation strategies.
Re-analysis is further justified by the potential for the failure prob-
ability requirements set in the preparatory step being violated from
unintended consequences of the mitigation strategies. For instance,
a new rotor shroud on the UAV SoI may significantly reduce
payload capacity thus violating requirement #1 from Table 1.
Iteration of the SoI system design through the method stops when
the requirements set in the preparatory step of the method are met.
At this point, the practitioner can be relatively confident in a thor-
ough consideration of potential SSEs having been conducted. Fur-
thermore, a practitioner can be reasonably assured that a significant
assessment of potential mitigation strategies has been completed.
The resulting SoI system design is expected to produce fewer
SSEs that may damage other systems within the SoS.
4 Discussion
The method presented above differs from existing methods of
identifying and mitigating SSEs in an SoS context in several
ways. Most existing methods such as requirements management,
PRA and FMECA, and other similar techniques from the systems
Table 2 Consequence data for an mixed UAV and unmanned
ground vehicle (UGV) SoS where consequence is the cost
distribution function Ce for the impact of the system on the SoS
Failure flow exports from
system of interest that leads
to initiating events for other
systems in the SoS Consequence Ce
Energy-electrical Static-electric discharges during dust
storms caused by UAV rotors or
propellers can short out onboard
electronics of nearby vehicles leading
to loss of both UAVs and UGVs
$5M
Material-solid-particulate Large particulate from crashed UAVs
can clog air vents and cause
overheating of UGVs leading to
disabled systems
$1M
Material-control-analog Interference with radio transceivers
causes UAVs to automatically land




Note: In this example, each Ce is a point distribution.
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engineering community either only implicitly suggest that SSEs be
examined and mitigated at the conceptual stage of design before
functional architecture has been solidified or explicitly examine
spurious systems emissions after functional architectures have
been finalized and component design has begun. While our previ-
ous work looks at SSEs [26], it does so from the perspective of
defending against the spurious system emissions rather than pre-
venting the emissions from occurring in the first place.
Successful implementation of the method in the system architec-
ture phase of the system design may benefit system engineers by




Primary Secondary Tertiary → Primary secondary Tertiary Component solution(s) to function
Material Human
Energy Mechanical Translational → Gas DC motor
Energy Electrical → Liquid AC motor
Energy Mechanical Translational → Solid Object AC motor, DC motor















Energy Mechanical Pneumatic → Visual Pneumatic motor
Energy Electrical → Control Analog AC motor















Energy Radioactive/nuclear → Thermal AC, DC, pneumatic motor
Note: Failure flows generated by specific component solutions are indicated on the right-hand side of the table. Failure flow exports that have been reasonably
proven to be impossible for the function to emit have been crossed out. In certain cases, multiple failure flow exports may be developed from the same failure
flow import. Additionally, some failure flow exports may have multiple associated component solutions to the function or one component solution to the
function may be associated with multiple potential failure flow exports.
Table 4 Subset of failure flow paths of the UAV SoI that exit the
system boundary
Flow
path Failure flow path
1 Energy-electrical → provision-supply → energy-electrical →
channel-export → signal-control-discrete
2 Material-mixture-gas/solid → channel-guide-translate →
material-solid
3 Provision-supply → energy-electrical → channel-guide-rotate
→ energy-thermal
⋮ ⋮
Table 5 Probability of occurrence of a representative subset of
failure flows identified through the proposedmethod that exit the
SoI boundary as SSEs
Failure flows that result in system emissions POe
Energy, mechanical, translational 2.2 × 10−4/year
Material, gas 4.3 × 10−3/year
Signal, status, visual 5.6 × 10−3/year
Material, solid, particulate 1.9 × 10−2/year
Material, liquid 8.3 × 10−3/year
⋮ ⋮
Table 6 Representative subset of SSE EPs of the UAV SoI
Spurious system emission Pe Ce EP
Energy-mechanical-translational 5.2 ×10−4/year $5M $2600/year
Material-solid-particulate 1.9 ×10−5/year $1M $19/year
Material-control-analog 2.6 ×10−4/year $2M $520/year
⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮
Note: Pe comes from Table 5 and Ce is from Table 2. Entries are rank
ordered by EP to indicate which SSEs have the biggest negative impact
on the SoS.
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aiding in identifying SSEs earlier than they otherwise would have
been—specifically during the development of functional architec-
ture models. By identifying potential SSEs very early in the
design process, system engineers can implement strategies to
prevent the SSEs from happening as part of the initial system archi-
tecting effort rather than implement remediation and/or mitigation
strategies much later in the systems design process where costs
are much higher and deviation from schedule may be significant.
During the development of the case study, we identified a few of
the types of unexpected insights that the proposed method may
uncover. For instance, we found that a variety of SSEs may make
the UAV SoIs in an SoS more detectable by adversaries. We also
found that some failures in subsystems such as those involved elec-
tronic warfare countermeasures on the UAV SoI may cause SSEs
that have a significant detrimental effect to the other systems in
the SoS including a disruption in communications. The method pro-
vides a framework to not only identify these SSEs and communicate
their impacts but also to weigh the trade-offs between mitigation
strategies at the functional stage.
The method can be used in parallel on many different SoIs within
an SoS which allows for a comparison across all mitigation strate-
gies for all SoIs in an SoS to be conducted during step 6 to identify
the biggest return on investment to buy down overall risk of SoS
failure. Taking a larger SoS-level view may help to save significant
cost and drastically increase probability of SoS mission success. An
initial investigation of conducing the method in parallel on multiple
SoIs indicates that the method presented above is quite extensible
and flexible in this regard.
One significant challenge of the method is the amount of effort
required to develop the various database products and analyses.
However, we argue that similar efforts are needed for PRA and
for other FFIP-based methods. In our experience, PRA analysis
can be extremely data-intensive and often span many years in the
case of complex systems such as nuclear reactors as evidenced by
the lengthy PRA process that reactors must undergo before they
are certified for construction and use [32].
One limitation of the method is that it is specifically designed to
be used in the case where a practitioner has a good understanding of
the SoS that the SoI being engineered will be placed within. In the
case where an entirely new SoS is under development, additional
methodological development is needed to manage the uncertainty
posed by the situation. If nothing is known of the SoS, Ce cannot
be determined. The only information available to a practitioner
would then be POe.
Validation of the results of the method is an important step that
we advocate be performed by a human. We intend for the method
to include a human in the loop at every iteration in order to vali-
date that the results are reasonable. While automating, the valida-
tion may be possible in the future with a very robust failure and
mitigation repository, such an undertaking is very resource-
intensive.
A potential fruitful avenue of future work may be to develop a
method that ties together failure analysis of an SoS by bridging
the method presented in this paper and our previous work [26].
This may provide a new way of making large system architecture
decisions while such decisions are still relatively inexpensive to
implement. However, the implementation may be computationally
prohibitive.
5 Conclusion
This paper presented a conceptual design method intended for
use during the system architecture phase of the systems engineering
process and specifically during functional architecture development
to identify and mitigate potential SSEs originating from a SoI that
can negatively impact an SoS. The method is conducted using func-
tional models which are appropriate for early system architecture
trade-off studies. A systematic way to identify potential low proba-
bility but high consequence SSEs is presented using the FBED flow
taxonomy. Practitioners can use the method to identify and mitigate
SSEs from an SoI to prevent damage to other systems within an
SoS. An illustrative case study of a UAV SoI being designed to
enter service with an existing SoS is presented to demonstrate the
method.
Acknowledgment
This research is partially supported by the Naval Postgraduate
School and the Technical University of Denmark. Any opinions
or findings of this work are the responsibility of the authors and
do not necessarily reflect the views of the sponsors or collaborators.
References
[1] Blanchard, B., and Fabrycky, W., 2006, Systems Engineering and Analysis, 4th
ed. (International Series in Industrial and Systems), Prentice-Hall, Upper
Saddle River, NJ.
[2] Kapurch, S., 2010, NASA Systems Engineering Handbook, DIANE Publishing
Company, Hanover, MD.
[3] Crawley, E., Cameron, B., and Selva, D., 2015, System Architecture: Strategy and
Product Development for Complex Systems. Always Learning. Pearson,
Hoboken, NJ.
[4] Gold, R., 2016, “Mission Engineering,” 19th Annual NDIA Systems Engineering
Conference, Springfield, VA, Oct. 24–27.
[5] Hernandez, A. S., Karimova, T., Nelson, D. H., Ng, E., Nepal, B., and Schott, E.,
2017, “Mission Engineering and Analysis: Innovations in the Military Decision
Making Process,” Proceedings of the American Society for Engineering
Management (ASEM) 2017 International Annual Conference: Reimagining
Systems Engineering andManagement, Huntsville, AL, Oct. 18–21, pp. 521–530.




function(s) Physical solution(s) PMe
New failure
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